Plaintiff W.L. Harris brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA") had unlawfully placed wetland easements on his land and that the property declared by the FmHA to encompass wetlands actually did not. The district court denied relief, 820 F. Supp. 1018. Harris now appeals, and we affirm.

* In 1987, the Grenada Bank of Mississippi foreclosed on 1,893 acres of farmland owned by Harris. The FmHA, which held a junior lien on the property, successfully bid for the property at the subsequent sale held by the bank. The following year, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), pursuant to a request from the FmHA, inspected the property, found that it contained large areas of wetlands, and recommended that the FmHA impose wetland conservation easements on approximately 1,005 acres. In June 1988, the FmHA offered to let Harris lease-back or buy-back the farmland, subject to conservation easements imposed on the 1,005 acres. Harris opted to repurchase the land for $371,700, which was the land's fair market value with the conservation easements in place.1 The wetland easements prevent Harris from farming the land and allow the FWS to manage water flow and other conditions on the land.

Harris subsequently sued the FmHA, contending that it had no authority to impose the wetland conservation easements. Harris alternatively contended that the FmHA's decision to impose the easements was arbitrary and capricious because much of the property designated as wetlands did not possess scientifically-accepted indicators of wetland status. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States as to Harris' first contention, holding that the FmHA had the authority to place wetland easements on the property that he repurchased. After a bench trial regarding the second claim, the district court found that the FmHA did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when imposing the easements because the land at issue constituted wetlands. Harris now appeals, contending that the district court erred with respect to both claims.

Executive Order 11990 requires that all federal agencies "take action to minimize the destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for (1) acquiring, managing, and disposing of Federal lands and facilities...." Exec. Order No. 11990, Sec. 1(a), 42 Fed.Reg. 26,961 (1977), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321 note (1988). Moreover,

[w]hen Federally-owned wetlands or portions of wetlands are proposed for lease, easement, right-of-way or disposal to non-Federal public or private parties, the Federal agency shall (a) reference in the conveyance those uses that are restricted under identified Federal, State or local wetlands regulations; and (b) attach other appropriate restrictions to the uses of properties by the grantee or purchaser and any successor, except where prohibited by law; or (c) withhold such properties from disposal.

Id. Sec. 4 (emphasis added). Both parties agree that this order, which was issued by President Carter pursuant to statutory authority,2 has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir.1985). The FmHA contends that the order authorized it to impose the wetland conservation easements at issue. Harris, on the other hand, argues that the FmHA was "prohibited by law"--i.e., prohibited by the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1526 (1985), and the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1669 (1988)--from imposing the challenged easements.

* Harris initially contends that 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e),3 which was added by the Agricultural Credit Act, prohibits the FmHA from imposing wetland easements on the property at issue because "[n]o where in the language of [Sec. 1985] is the Secretary given the right to condition the exercise of leaseback/buyback rights on the acceptance of a wetlands easement." In essence, Harris' argument is that Congress prohibited the FmHA from imposing wetland conservation easements by not specifically codifying the FmHA's authority to do so. Nonetheless, there is no question that, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, Executive Order 11990 binds the FmHA. Thus, the issue presented is whether Congress sub-silentio rendered Executive Order 11990 void as it pertains to the buyback program by not specifically codifying the FmHA's authority to impose wetland easements. Harris relies upon four statutory provisions to support his contention that Congress barred the FmHA from imposing wetland conservation easements on property subject to the borrower's redemption rights.

* Harris first asserts that language found in Sec. 1985(e)(7) supports his interpretation of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Subsection (7) states:

In the case of farmland administered under this chapter that is highly erodible land (as defined in section 3801 of Title 16), the Secretary may require the use of specified conservation practices on such land as a condition of the sale or lease of such land.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e)(7). Because Congress did not similarly codify the FmHA's authority to impose such conditions of sale with regard to wetlands, Harris concludes that subsection (7) provides "strong evidence of Congress' intent not to subordinate the leaseback/buyback rights to any affirmative duty that the FmHA might have had under Executive Order 11990 to place wetlands easements on inventory land." However, an alternative--and more plausible--reading of Congress' inaction is that Congress felt no need to codify the FmHA's power to impose wetland easements because Executive Order 11990 already obliged the FmHA to do so. Consequently, we find Harris' contention unavailing.

Harris next argues that the language of 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1997, which authorizes the FmHA to acquire conservation easements from delinquent borrowers, supports his reading of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Section 1997 allow the FmHA to "purchase" such easements

by canceling that part of the aggregate amount of such outstanding loans of the borrower held by the Secretary ... that bears the same ratio to the aggregate amount of the outstanding loans of such borrower held by the Secretary ... as the number of acres of the real property of such borrower that are subject to such easement bears to the aggregate number of acres securing such loans.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 1997(e). Harris concludes that because "Congress intended for the FmHA to 'purchase' conservation easements from distressed borrowers, Congress did not intend to empower the Secretary of Agriculture to extract a conservation easement by coercion from a farmer exercising his leaseback/buyback rights." Harris, however, overlooks the fact that the Sec. 1997 program could not be used in this case because Grenada Bank, not the FmHA, foreclosed upon Harris' farm. Thus, the FmHA could not have purchased the easements from Harris as Harris did not own the property when the FmHA acquired it. Accordingly, Harris' reliance upon Sec. 1997 is misplaced.

Harris next points to Sec. 616 of the Agricultural Credit Act, which allows the FmHA, for conservation purposes, to transfer to a Federal or State agency any real property administered by the FmHA "with respect to which the rights of all prior owners and operators have expired." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2002. Harris argues that because "Congress expressly made leaseback/buyback rights superior to the right of the FmHA to transfer land under the 616 program ..., it would seem logical that Congress also intended to make leaseback/buyback rights superior to the right of FmHA to exercise its authority under Executive Order 11990 to enhance wetlands." Harris fails to demonstrate, however, that the imposition of wetland conservation easements pursuant to Executive Order 11990 is inconsistent with the Sec. 616 program. Indeed, Congress now has statutorily authorized the FmHA to impose easements on inventory land subject to the redemption provision of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A), see part II.A.4 infra, while at the same time retaining the Sec. 616 program. Consequently, we find Harris' contention without merit.

Harris finally contends that 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(g), which Harris concedes is not applicable here,4 supports his interpretation of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Subsection (g) allows the FmHA to "establish perpetual wetland conservation easements to protect and restore wetlands or converted wetlands that exist on inventoried property, as determined by the Secretary in accordance with title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. Sec. 3801 et seq.)." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1993). Harris submits that Congress charged the FmHA with the duty to impose such easements because the FmHA did not have such a duty previously. Harris, however, fails to recognize that Congress, in adopting subsection (g), recognized the prior existing authority of the FmHA to impose wetland conservation easements. For example, the relevant Senate report noted that the enactment of subsection (g) would

alleviate[ ] a problem with the current use of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service easements on inventory property.... Easements can reduce the productive value of the property in some cases. For the FmHA borrower/owner who conveyed his or her property to the agency, and who exercises his or her redemption rights, the land could be worth less than when it was conveyed.

S.Rep. No. 357, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 243-44 (1990) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4897-98. Thus, that Congress added Sec. 1985(g) does not support Harris' contention that the FmHA lacked the authority to impose wetland easements on property subject to the buyback program. Instead, Congress enacted subsection (g) to restrict the FmHA's already existing authority to impose wetland easements on federally-owned property. Accordingly, the enactment of Sec. 1985(g) actually cuts against Harris' proposed interpretation of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A).

Harris has produced no evidence suggesting that Congress intended to repeal Executive Order 11990 as it applies to FmHA inventory land. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 490, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3281, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985) (noting that if Congress wishes to change the law in a "novel" way, some mention of that intent should be present in the statute or its legislative history); Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (4th Cir.1993) ("It is settled law that repeal of a statute by implication is not favored."). Moreover, Executive Order 11990 and 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A) do not conflict such that the two cannot operate concurrently. See 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 23.09, at 338 (5th ed. 1993) (noting that "in the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable or if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute"). Furthermore, subsection (e)(1)(B) states that "[a]ny purchase or lease under [Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A) ] shall be on such terms and conditions as are established in regulations promulgated by the Secretary." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The regulations promulgated by the FmHA explicitly require that wetland conservation easements be placed on land sold pursuant to the buyback program authorized by Sec. 1985.5 Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Congress, when authorizing the redemption program, intended to bar the FmHA from imposing wetland conservation easements under Executive Order 11990.6

* Harris' second claim is that the FmHA's designation of certain areas of his property as wetlands constitutes arbitrary and capricious action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706. "Under the APA, the administrative record is reviewed to determine whether the challenged action was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law...." State of Louisiana v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir.1988); see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A). Under this "very narrow" standard of review, we may not "weigh the evidence in the record pro and con." Verity, 853 F.2d at 327. Instead, "our role is to review the agency action to determine whether the decision 'was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of judgment.' "7 Id. (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2966-67, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983)). "Thus, if the agency considers the factors and articulates a rational relationship between the facts found and the choice made, its decision is not arbitrary or capricious." Id. "Indeed, the agency's decision need not be ideal, so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious, and so long as the agency gave at least minimal consideration to relevant facts contained in the record." Id. (footnote omitted).

those areas that are inundated by surface or ground water with a frequency sufficient to support and under normal circumstances does or would support a prevalence of vegetative or aquatic life that requires saturated or seasonally saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas such as sloughs, potholes, wet meadows, river overflows, mud flats, and natural ponds.

Exec. Order No. 11990, Sec. 7(c). While the Order does not provide a methodology for determining whether a specific parcel of land constitutes wetland, the parties nevertheless agree that property constitutes a wetland area only when both a wetland hydrology and hydric soils are present and the area's vegetation is predominately hydrophytic.8 Pursuant to those criteria, Charles McCabe, a FWS biologist, made the initial recommendation regarding Harris' property.9 Harris contends that the process by which McCabe produced his proposed delineation was so flawed as to render McCabe's conclusions, the FWS's wetland delineation, and the FmHA's decision to implement the FWS's delineation arbitrary and capricious agency action.B

Before conducting an on-site inspection of the property at issue, which consisted of four separate tracts of land, McCabe examined the topographical maps and aerial photographs for the applicable area to determine the boundaries of Harris' land. McCabe also examined the relevant soil surveys prepared by the United States Soil Conservation Service ("SCS") to ascertain whether the soils in the region surrounding Harris' property were hydric or non-hydric. McCabe further examined flood data accumulated by the Corps of Engineers to discern whether Harris' property fell within a flood plain. McCabe and two other biologists--one from the Mississippi Department of Wildlife Conservation and one from FWS Division of Wildlife Refuges--subsequently inspected Harris' land, spending a total of approximately seven hours on the four tracts. McCabe then formulated proposed wetland delineations, which he discussed with FWS Acting Field Supervisor Robert Barkley. McCabe, accompanied by Barkley, later inspected Harris' property a second time. After the latter inspection, Barkley, and the review committee of the FWS regional office, approved McCabe's report and recommendations that wetland easements be imposed on all four tracts of land.10 The FmHA accepted the recommendations without change. Harris, relying primarily on the testimony of his expert, contends that McCabe's delineation is deficient for a multitude of reasons.11

Harris initially contends that McCabe failed to employ a scientifically acceptable methodology when formulating his wetland easements recommendations because he was not aware of and did not refer to FWS publications dealing with wetland delineation. McCabe, however, testified that he followed the FWS-approved three parameter approach--which requires an examination of the land's vegetation, hydrology, and soils--when determining whether Harris' property included wetlands, although he admittedly did not specifically refer to the publications when formulating his recommendations. Although Harris attempted at trial to discredit McCabe, the district court chose to credit McCabe's testimony. On the cold record before us, we cannot say the district court erred in doing so. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985) (noting that we must give "due regard to the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses"). Moreover, while McCabe may not have been as experienced in delineating wetlands as Dr. Heineke, McCabe did have sufficient expertise in wetland classification in that, at the time he inspected Harris' property, he had eighteen years experience dealing with wetlands and wetland issues and had delineated forty-four other properties.

Harris next argues that the FWS wetland delineation was fatally flawed because McCabe failed both to procure soil samples from the four tracts and to accurately measure whether the vegetation present on all four tracts was predominately hydrophytic.12 However, the SCS soil surveys consulted by McCabe prior to his on-site inspection evidenced the presence of hydric soils on tracts I, II, and III. Moreover, based on prior experience, the SCS and the FWS previously had determined that, with very few exceptions, hydrophytic vegetation predominated on all land situated within the Mississippi delta area.13 Additionally, maps prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture demonstrated that wetlands surrounded tracts I and III, and flood data gathered by the Army Corps of Engineers demonstrated that tracts I, II, and III were under water for extended periods of time at least one year out of every three.14 Finally, data obtained from the Corps of Engineers demonstrated that tract IV also was subject to frequent flooding.15 Consequently, sufficient evidence supports the FmHA's decision to impose wetland easements on Harris' land.

Harris next points out that the easements imposed by the FmHA include not only wetlands, but also what the FWS termed "wetland buffer areas."16 Harris contends that Executive Order 11990 does not allow the FmHA to impose easements on land that does not satisfy the definition of wetlands. McCabe testified that buffer zones contained highly erodible land that, if protected by an easement, would help to both protect and allow proper management of the wetlands. Furthermore, Steve Gard, a FWS employee and an expert in the area of wetland science, explained that the FWS sometimes recommended that the FmHA impose an easement somewhat larger than the actual wetland area because the FWS needed to "block off" an area of land for management purposes. For example, Gard explained that if the FWS designated only "each and every" acre of wetland, an accurate description for surveying and title recording purposes would be impossible. Moreover, if the FWS attempted to manage water movement on such small areas, non-easement lands most likely would be flooded. Based upon such evidence, we conclude that the FmHA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in imposing wetland easements on property considered to be part of a wetland buffer zone. See S.Rep. No. 357 at 217, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4871 (noting that buffer areas sometimes are needed "to produce a high quality wetland").

Finally, Harris argues that McCabe's delineation was deficient because McCabe failed to make or keep field notes recording the observations he made while inspecting the four tracts of land.17 McCabe, however, testified as to both the observations he made while inspecting the property and the conclusions that he reached based on those observations. Moreover, as the district court concluded, evidence presented at trial "clearly indicates a wealth of institutional knowledge available to the agency participants, and upon which they drew[ ] in making the delineations in issue."18 Thus, while it certainly should not be standard agency procedure to discard such material, the facts presented here demonstrate that the FmHA's decision to implement the wetland delineations recommended by the FWS was not arbitrary and capricious.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.